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ABSTRACT 
 
Recently, the psychological study of morality has been transformed by new 
concepts, theories and models. The purpose of this study is to carry out an 
empirical study investigating moral development of adolescents in Turkey using a 
cultural-developmental framework. This framework proposes three ethics 
(Autonomy, Community and Divinity) that may vary across cultures and across 
the lifespan.  The study investigated the development of moral worldviews of 
adolescents at four different age groups (12-13 years, Group 1; 14-15 years, 
Group 2; 16-17 years, Group 3; and 18-29 years, Group 4) in responding to the 
Ethical Values Assessment (EVA) and further whether the adolescent’s 
endorsement of the three ethics is related to religious education (whether or not 
the student has taken any special religious course outside of school) and how 
much time they spend on religious practices in their everyday lives. The results 
showed that age, religious education and religious practice were all related to the 
use of three ethics, specifically that, although endorsement of the Autonomy ethic 
did not vary across the age groups, both Community and Divinity declined with 
age, while both religious education and religious practice were related to higher 
endorsement of Divinity. This study contribute to the understanding of (1) how 
moral values develop across adolescence; (2) the relation between religious 
education and the development process; (3) the relation between religious practice 
and the development process; (4) cross-cultural similarities and differences in the 
development process, by comparing data from this study with previous studies 
done in other countries. 
 
Keywords: cultural developmental framework, morality, adolescence, three ethics, 
religious education, religious practice, culture 
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ÖZET 
 
Ahlak psikolojisi son dönemlerdeki yeni kavramlar, teoriler ve modeller 
tarafından değişmiş ve dönüşmüştür. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye'deki 
ergenlerin ahlaki gelişimini kültürel-gelişimsel perspektiften inceleyen deneysel 
bir çalışma yapmaktır. Bu perspektif, kültürler arasında ve yaşam süresi boyunca 
değişebilen üç etik (Özerklik, Topluluk ve Din) yaklaşımını önermektedir. Bu 
çalışmada, dört farklı yaş grubundan ergenlerin (12-13 yaş, Grup 1; 14-15 yaş, 
Grup 2; 16-17 yaş, Grup 3; 18-29 yaş, Grup 4) Etik Değerler Ölçeği’ne (EDÖ) 
verdikleri cevaplar ışığında ahlaki dünya görüşlerinin gelişimi araştırılmıştır. 
Ayrıca, bu yaş gruplarındaki ergenlerin üç etik dünya görüşünü benimseme 
düzeylerinin dini eğitim (okul dışında herhangi bir dini eğitim alınıp alınmaması) 
ve günlük yaşamda din pratiklerine ayrılan zaman ile ilişkisi araştırılmıştır. Bu 
araştırmanın sonuçları, yaşın, dini eğitimin ve dini pratiklere ayrılan zamanın üç 
etik kullanımı ile ilişkili olduğunu ve özellikle, Özerklik etiğinin 
benimsenmesinin yaş gruplarına göre değişmediğini, Topluluk ve Din etiğinin 
yaşla birlikte azaldığını ve dini eğitim ve dini pratiğin daha yüksek Din etiği 
benimsemesi ile ilişkili olduğunu göstermiştir.  Bu çalışma (1) ergenlik 
döneminde ahlaki değerlerin nasıl geliştiğinin; (2) dini eğitim ve ahlak gelişim 
süreci arasındaki ilişkinin; (3) dini pratiklere ayrılan zaman ile ahlak gelişim 
süreci arasındaki ilişkinin; (4) bu çalışmadan elde edilen verileri diğer ülkelerde 
yapılan önceki çalışmalarla karşılaştırarak, ahlak gelişimi sürecinde kültürlerarası 
benzerliklerin ve farklılıkların anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunmuştur.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: kültürel gelişimsel perspektif, ahlak, ergenlik, üç etik 
yaklaşımı, dini eğitim, dini pratik, kültür 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY 
 
1.1.1. The Roots of Moral Psychology 
 
The relationship between morality and human nature has been a topic of 
debate among philosophers for many years. Some have argued that human beings 
are endowed with an innate sense of morality that can be distorted by external 
factors. Others have argued that morality is an expression of adaptation. 
Biological theories of morality and sociobiological theories of morality were not a 
subject of psychological research until the 1930s. 
 The roots of moral psychology come from philosophers such as Aristotle, 
Plato and Socrates. Philosophers looked for ways in which people “know the 
good” and “do the good”. They searched for the grounds for the nature of good 
and evil or right and wrong. In recent years, the field of moral psychology has 
become a thriving area of research at an interdisciplinary level (Doris & Stich, 
2008). At this level, moral psychology searches for human functioning in moral 
contexts and its impact in the discussion of ethical theory. This analyzing process 
includes both empirical resources and conceptual resources. 
  In analyzing conceptual resources, the meaning of morality and the way it 
is acquired has been one of the most important issues throughout human history 
(Cesur, 2018). The meaning of morality is explained in different ways in different 
sources. For instance, in the dictionary for philosophical terms morality is defined 
as the “science that determines and examines individual and social behavior 
patterns at a certain period of a certain society” (Hançerlioğlu, 1989). Also, in a 
dictionary written in the Ottoman Turkish language morality is defined as “a state 
of spirit and heart that human beings gain either from birth or education” (Özön, 
1988). In addition, the English word “moral” is derived from the Latin word 
“moralis”. The root of the word comes from “mor” which means “manner, ethics, 
character, temper” (Merriam-Webster, 2019). All in all, these definitions of 
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morality imply that it includes innate and learned properties. Sunar (2018, p.3) 
gives an adapted version of dictionary definitions: “morality consists of the rules 
of conduct based on conscience or the sense of right and wrong”. The following 
will be parallel with this definition and will discuss cultural developmental moral 
theory starting from Piaget’s cognitive developmental theory.   
 
1.1.2. A Brief History of the Psychology of Morality 
 
 Before deeply discussing the cognitive developmental model, it is 
important to mention the theories that have influenced the psychology of morality. 
Throughout the years, the psychology of morality was dominated by different 
theories such as psychoanalytical theory, social learning theory, and cognitive 
developmental theory (Sunar, 2009).  Yet, with the rise of evolutionary 
psychology, the concept of morality has transformed into new concepts and 
theories. As the inadequacies of the old theories have been discussed, alternative 
models have been suggested with new integrations.  
 The psychoanalytic approach, which set the debate of morality for many 
years, is criticized for focusing especially on sexual morality and focusing largely 
on moral feelings of anxiety, shame, and guilt. Yet, this approach is very 
important in the sense that the capacity for moral feeling has been seen an 
indicator of having a conscience (Sunar, 2018). Social learning theorists who 
focus on reinforcement, modeling, and punishment together with the role of 
emotions have put an emphasis on conditioned anxiety. However, they have failed 
to account for other moral feelings such as shame and guilt regarding age-related 
changes. Moreover, cognitive developmental theory introduced different premises 
developed by Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1969, 1981). They called 
psychoanalytic and social learning approaches into question and showed that 
moral understanding may continue to develop across the years into adulthood 
which explains progressive developing moral judgment. Although this was a 
remarkable step for moral psychology, cognitive developmental theory was 
limited to providing clear evidence for moral developmental stages and centered 
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only upon one aspect of morality i.e. issues of justice (Sunar, 2009). Furthermore, 
the evolutionary psychologists put emphasis on the functions of morality in group 
competition that became dominant in the field. All these aspects shed light on new 
theories and give rise to suggestions for new integrations such as the cultural 
developmental approach to moral psychology by Richard Schweder and Lene 
Arnett Jensen. This theoretical approach to human psychology includes both 
universal and culturally distinctive ways of thinking about psychological 
development in today’s global world (Jensen, 2015). Therefore, it can be claimed 
that the “one-size-fits-all psychological theories” of the 20th century are giving 
way to a flexible and dynamic way of thinking in psychological development 
(Jensen, 2019). 
 In the 20th century, Kohlberg (1969) introduced moral development theory 
building his theory on Piaget’s (1932) theory of cognitive development. 
Kohlberg’s theory was highly influenced by Piaget’s theory and he extended 
Piaget’s account of moral reasoning. Piaget in 1932 wrote The Moral Judgment of 
the Child in which he became the first psychologist who tried to explain the moral 
judgments of children in a systematic way.  Piaget (1967) argued that moral 
development is in line with cognitive development in which morality develops 
along with specific cognitive developmental stages and interaction with the 
child’s social environment. Kohlberg (1969) agreed with Piaget that morality 
develops in parallel with cognitive development which means that it develops as a 
result of age progression and increased experience. Piaget (1932) was interested 
in how children understand moral theories and whether these developmental 
phenomena will help us understand the transformation of ethical codes in society. 
 Understanding the moral reasoning of a child helps us to understand moral 
development as the development of a system of rules, and enlightens the relation 
between the rules and individuals who acquire the rules. In this search for the 
origin and development of morality, important aspects include justice, fairness, 
and gaining the ability to regulate one’s own behavior along with society’s 
standards (Bandura, 1986; Piaget, 1932). Piaget (1932) in exploring children’s 
moral reasoning investigated the process of how children act in accordance with 
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society’s norms of what is right and wrong as active, exploratory members of 
society. He believes that the development of moral reasoning is a qualitative 
transformation of a child’s thinking and the course of development requires a 
logically ordered sequence of stages (Durkin, 1995).  
 
1.2. MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
1.2.1. A Cognitive Developmental Approach 
 
1.2.1.1. Piaget and Moral Development 
 
 To begin with, Piaget first focused on schematizing the perception of rules 
in children by examining their rules when they play games. Then, he started 
investigating issues such as honesty, lying and moral judgment. Piaget (1932) in 
his search for development of reasoning about moral issues identified three stages 
for moral development: amoral, heteronomous and autonomous. The first stage is 
the amoral stage. In this stage, the behavior of children is regulated predominantly 
from outside and children are not receptive to moral meanings. Piaget put 
emphasis on the latter two stages. He outlined the characteristics of heteronomous 
and autonomous stages of morality through his clinical interviews.  
Heteronomous morality is also referred as moral realism and autonomous 
morality is also regarded as moral relativism. Briefly, there are universal stages to 
children’s moral development just like their cognitive development and morality 
is not inherited and it is not simply learned from others.  
 According to Piaget (1932), the stage of heteronomous morality puts an 
emphasis on morality imposed from outside therefore, morality is centered outside 
of self. Children at this stage (from approximately 5 to 10 years) see morality as 
obeying the rules in terms of its observable consequences. Young children’s 
respect for authority and rules are said to be absolute and directed towards adults.  
So, in heteronomous stage, children perceive rules as unchanging, “divine like” 
and established by others. This is also called as “moral realism”. Children accept 
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that rules are made by authority figures like parents, teachers or God and breaking 
the rules (such as lying or stealing) will result in immediate and strict punishment.  
 In other words, at this stage children see rules as unchangeable and believe 
that the rules and justice is whatever the authority says it is. If rules are broken, 
imminent justice follows, that is, immediate punishment. So, children see each 
other as either good or bad by the consequences of their actions because they do 
not see intentions and motives. Therefore, a child who breaks one cup on purpose 
is seen as being better than a child who breaks three cups by accident because 
they see that more objects broken means more punishment. Piaget (1932) believes 
that this attitude is due to two cognitive inabilities; distinguishing their point of 
view from others (egocentrism) and confusing subjective events with objective 
results (realism). The moral ideology that emerges from the interaction of this 
dependent respect and cognitive realism can be described as moral realism (Cesur, 
2018).  
 The second and last stage for Piaget is the stage of autonomous morality 
(or the morality of cooperation). At this stage, morality is based on one’s own 
rules. Children stop anticipating the unquestionable just world where authority 
detects misdeeds and deals with it accordingly. The child’s absolutist concept for 
rigid and unalterable rules shifts into a concept of rule that is based on reciprocity. 
In the late childhood, children realize that there is not an absolute right or wrong 
and morality is dependent on intentions rather than consequences. At this stage 
children start to interact with their peers more and they can see that rules can 
change if the group agrees upon it. They also begin to take one another’s 
perspective and to cooperate more. So, they value fairness more than they used to. 
Children no longer accept blind obedience to authority as the basis for moral 
decision. They begin to understand rules as a product of social agreement and the 
majority of the group can change them if they agree. They also understand that 
our motives and intentions direct our actions and that therefore, the punishment 
should fit the crime. Hence, children’s understanding of morality undergoes an 
important reorganization and children’s thinking evolves into adult like thinking.   
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 The first signs of autonomy emerge when children discover that honesty is 
necessary for mutual respect and sympathy. In addition, autonomy will derive 
from mutual respect in that the child will behave the way they want to be treated 
(Cesur, 2018). Piaget (1932) believed that the development of mutual respect for 
others is due to the development of an autonomous view of rules that serve the 
function of cooperation and group consensus. So, mutual respect develops as the 
capacity to distinguish one’s own point of view from others improves along with 
reciprocity.  
 In brief, Piaget in his theory of moral development focused on the way 
children understand rules, moral responsibility and justice. He investigated where 
do rules come from? Who makes the rules? Can rules be changed? What is the 
difference between accidental and deliberate wrongdoing? Is it the outcome or the 
intention that makes an action “bad”? Is guilt always punished? Or should the 
punishment always fit the crime? (McLeod, 2015).  Piaget (1932) as a cognitive 
developmental theorist proposed the first theory for the development of moral 
reasoning. Many studies of cognitive development in children were built on his 
theory. Piaget’s model is also very important in emphasizing the child as 
constructing moral principles rather than just learning them. Piaget challenges the 
dominant ‘outside-in’ model in psychoanalytic and social learning approaches 
where moral norms are ‘outside’ and expected by authorities to induce the child to 
‘internalize’ (Sunar, 2009). According to Piaget’s model, children construct their 
conception of moral rules with regard to the social world, especially the world of 
peers (Sunar, 2018). Therefore, Piaget’s theory is important for implying that 
moral criteria can be generated in the light of social experience. Furthermore, 
numerous studies (e.g., Costanzo, Coie, Grumet, & Farnill, 1973; Farnill, 1974; 
Imamoğlu, 1975; Walden, 1982; Yuill, 1984) showed that young children can and 
often do use information about intention in their moral judgments much earlier 
than Piaget recognized. In other words, research found that young children are 
able to show sophisticated understanding regarding the roles of intention in their 
moral judgments (Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009).  
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1.2.1.2. Kohlberg and Moral Development 
 
Following Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg extended Piaget’s account of stage-
sequence development in moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1958) agreed with Piaget on 
his constructivist theory but he wanted to develop his ideas further. Kohlberg 
found Piaget’s theory insufficient in terms of the methodology used and, 
Kohlberg believed that Piaget’s analysis of later development is restricted.  
Hence, Kohlberg (1963) extended his study of moral reasoning into adolescence 
and adulthood. In addition, he made a great contribution to the psychology of 
morality by developing a standardized procedure to elicit responses from 
participants. Kohlberg has changed Piaget’s clinical interview technique into a 
structured, standardized research enriched by both qualitative and quantitative 
research methods.  
 Kohlberg is best-known for his moral dilemmas. Kohlberg (1963) 
presented moral dilemmas to large numbers of American participants and asked 
them to make a decision about what a person should do. Then, they are asked to 
explain the basis for their responses. Rather than focusing on judgments of right 
and wrong, Kohlberg (1969) used the reasoning behind the judgment to 
distinguish moral reasoning into three broad levels: morality of constraint, 
morality of convention, and post-conventional level. Furthermore, each level 
consists of two stages. In the first level, morality is imposed by authority with 
greater power; at the second level, the child perceives the rules and authority as an 
element of the social order; and at the third level, the young person perceives 
morality with respect to principles of justice and abstract values (Durkin, 1995). 
Kohlberg, like Piaget, believes that moral development proceeds sequentially. Not 
everyone reaches the higher stages, but each individual progress through the 
stages in the same logical order. Each stage is built on the previous stage by 
transcending the reasoning for the previous stage and the change in moral 
reasoning is predictable across childhood and youth.  
There are similarities and differences between Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s 
theory of moral development. Kohlberg is different from Piaget in terms of the 
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number of the sequential stages and the age period in which moral development is 
believed to be completed. While Piaget argues that at the age 11-12, children 
complete their moral development as they reach the cognitive stage of formal 
operations; Kohlberg argues that moral development continues until at least 16 
years of age. Therefore, for Kohlberg (1975), moral reasoning is a process that 
develops through adolescence and early adulthood.  
 Early theories and research in the field of moral psychology were largely 
dominated by Piaget and Kohlberg’s work that stresses universal standards of 
moral reasoning and development. Although their work expanded the scale of 
moral psychology research, they were criticized in both theoretical and empirical 
terms. Many of Piaget and Kohlberg’s studies provide support for the 
improvement in moral reasoning following a stage wise process and many aspects 
of their theories were supported by cross-cultural research. However, there are 
disputes about the methodologies they use, whether young children are amoral or 
not, the difference between moral rules and social conventions, the relationship 
between moral development and moral action, and the neglect of the emotional 
dimension in moral judgment.  
 Both Piaget and Kohlberg grounded their theories on stages and self-
contained structures. Piaget (1932) believed that moral development progresses 
toward individual autonomy and mutual respect. This presumes a prioritizing of 
justice over society indicating that convention is seen as an inadequate form of 
morality (Nucci & Turiel, 1978). Similar to Piaget, Kohlberg (1969) did not 
distinguish moral and societal domains. Turiel (1983) on the other hand, 
distinguished moral domain from social conventional domain. For him, focusing 
on an individualistic understanding of morality shows a lack of concern for 
community involvement (Turiel, 2002).  
 
1.2.2. The Domain Approach 
 
 Turiel (1983) in The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and 
Convention emphasized the way moral judgments develop in children and 
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adolescents, and the way conventions of social systems evolve. He studied social 
and moral development of individuals and the way cultural contexts affect 
individuals’ thoughts and actions (Turiel, 2002). In light of his studies, he 
introduced a new perspective and a more general view of social development.  
 Turiel and Nucci (1978) investigated social interactions and the 
development of social concepts in younger children in terms of moral and societal 
domains. The domain of moral knowledge is concerned with concepts of justice, 
fairness, individual rights, and harm to other people. The domain of social 
convention is concerned with rules, social organization, and behavioral 
uniformities that allow individuals to coordinate their behavior in a community. 
The difference between these domains is derived from social experiences. To find 
this, Turiel and Nucci (1978) observed and rated 98 events (50 social 
conventional and 48 moral events) from different preschools in a naturalistic 
setting that involve social conventional or moral transgressions. It is hypothesized 
that young children form different conceptual frameworks from different types of 
social interactions. So, some types of experiences lead to social convention 
concepts and others lead to moral concepts. As a result, they found that responses 
to moral transgressions are qualitatively different than social conventional 
transgressions. In light of the observational data supporting this developmental 
model, researchers found that preschool children construct different concepts 
originating from different types of responses. To clarify, they found that young 
children are able to name behaviors like hitting, lying, and stealing as wrong even 
when there is not an institutional authority, while they can accept other 
transgressions such as calling the teacher by their name or eating with hands at 
school if they are not prohibited (Turiel, 1983). These findings contradict both 
Piagetian and Kohlbergian views of morality. The source of rules in young 
children is no more seen as external, given only by an authority and consequence 
based like in Piaget’s theory or conventions are not outweighed only in the later 
stages of adolescence like in Kohlberg’s theory. Their theories are extended by 
Turiel (1983) with his orientation to social reasoning and the way it is transformed 
in the process of growth. 
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 In brief, Turiel (1983) draws a distinction between the moral domain and 
the social conventional domain. The rule that prohibits killing other people 
belongs to the moral domain because this rule is obligatory, it is same for 
everyone, it is not based on a personal preference, and it applies to everyone. On 
the other hand, the rule that you must take off your shoes when entering a house 
belongs to the social conventional domain. This is because this rule is arbitrary 
and it applies only to certain cultures. Turiel (1983) believes that in both cases the 
knowledge that divides the moral domain and the social conventional domain 
comes from social experiences. If morality is based on the consequences of an 
action for other people as in early theories, then entering a house with shoes on 
would not be moral knowledge since it is not like hitting someone and injuring the 
recipient. Yet, it is a social conventional knowledge taking its roots from the 
social system. Conventions can be both preserved and changed by consensus 
and they may vary in different situations. All in all, the difference between the 
moral domain and the social conventional domain is a philosophical debate and 
morality should be examined from a wider perspective by extending the 
discussion with social knowledge. 
 Back to the disputes regarding cognitive developmental theories of moral 
reasoning, the relationship between moral reasoning and moral behavior has been 
questioned. For Kohlberg (1976) moral stage was a good predictor of behavior.  
Hence, people with higher levels of moral reasoning tend to have higher standards 
of behavior in accordance with stages. Although there is an association between 
moral level and moral action (Blasi, 1980), the link between them is not strong 
enough and it is criticized as not being well established (Kutnick, 1986). 
Furthermore, moral dilemmas that were proposed by Kohlberg do not sufficiently 
represent real life situations since the perception of the dilemma does not 
necessarily reveal the way people will choose to behave in real life situations 
(McClelland, 1982). The importance of decision making and the study of thinking 
were neglected by cognitive psychology along with emotions. Kohlberg’s theory 
was criticized for not paying attention to the role of emotions as a guide to 
behavior (Hoffman, 1970). Even though Kohlberg’s theory was subjected to 
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criticism, he was very successful in contributing to the moral psychology 
literature by enriching the discussion on moral development in the 20th century. 
Especially, his idea that individuals start questioning norms of the society as they 
develop the capacity to take other’s perspective has a great importance for 
explaining that morality was not necessarily represented in actual social norms 
(Sunar, 2009, p. 449). 
 Cognitive developmental theorists believed that moral reasoning was 
fundamental to explain the development of morality. Theorists following Piaget 
tried to uncover the stages in moral development. In particular, Kohlberg provided 
a basis for many studies. Although there are studies supporting the development 
of moral reasoning in a hierarchical stage-sequence account and its universality, 
there are disputes on the fundamental premises of these views. These ideas had 
been challenged with an attempt to (1) provide more information for preschool 
children’s moral judgment, (2) emphasize the difference between morality and 
convention (also applying to young children), (3) point out the inadequate 
explanation of the relationship between moral reasoning and moral behavior, (4) 
stress the neglect of emotions, decision making and thinking processes. The more 
the number of studies in the field of moral psychology increased, the more the 
lack of social context of moral development and behavior was felt. Therefore, 
theorists began to consider issues regarding family, gender, and culture to 
challenge cognitive developmental perspective. In other words, the concept of a 
universal moral code, the link between moral reasoning and behavior, and 
prevailing societal values began to be seen as more complicated than the way 
cognitive developmental theorists had discussed them in the earlier years.  
 Researchers such as Thoma, Rest, and Davison (1991) changed 
Kohlbergian justice based assessments of moral judgment development model 
into an improved model with motivational and behavioral aspects of morality. 
They believed that Kohlbergian moral dilemmas allow us to make inferences only 
in the level of justice reasoning. Therefore, the possibility of other interpretive 
systems was sought in solving moral dilemmas. Turiel (1983) and Nucci (1985), 
with Social Domain Theory, presented a new perspective by claiming that the 
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concept of morality and the concept of social convention develop separately and 
these concepts are constructed in the process of differentiated social interactions 
and social experiences among children. Also, Hoffman (2000) brought three 
dimensions of behavioral, cognitive and emotional dimensions of moral 
development together which he named as prosocial moral development. He also 
offered a stage based theory, but for empathy development. All these theories 
improve, extend and to some degree contradict Kohlberg and Piaget’s models 
(Sunar, 2009).  
 
1.2.3. Two Orientations Approach 
 
 In addition to these researchers, Carol Gilligan (1977, 1982) challenged 
Kohlberg’s model by arguing that Kohlberg’s model is based on a male 
perspective and mostly focused on the development of the concept of justice 
(fairness or harm). Therefore, she believed that the testing process was biased. 
Since Kohlberg’s early work was mostly conducted with male participants and 
with male characters involved in the dilemmas, she began to search for real-life 
moral decisions of women by adding a new dimension to moral psychology, that 
is, “care”. Gilligan (1982) argued that Kohlberg’s theory is limited in the sense 
that it is not generalizable to females. She believed rather that moral development 
is based on masculine and feminine moral voices. Hence, she focused on 
“different voices” with a “care perspective” by putting emphasis on interpersonal 
relationships, cooperation, intimacy, and responsibility to others. In brief, Gilligan 
by introducing new dimensions to moral development broadened the scope of 
moral reasoning and contributed to how concepts of morality should be measured 
and interpreted.  
 
1.3. CULTURE AND MORALITY 
 
 It is clear that both Piaget and Kohlberg set the cornerstones of moral 
development as a social achievement. Furthermore, with recent studies, the search 
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for complexities in moral development increased. Especially, with Richard 
Shweder’s studies, the importance of the search for social cognitive structures that 
are fundamental to understand moral orders in different cultural groups was 
highlighted. There is a dispute on whether Kohlberg’s model is insensitive to the 
moral reasoning in other cultures. Kohlberg’s study was conducted in Western 
culture yet; Shweder (1991) believed that there might be differences in 
understanding morality with respect to culture. Although there were cross cultural 
studies supporting Kohlberg’s model, it did not hold up well in different cultures. 
Studies in the rural areas or “less developed” nations showed lower scores in 
moral reasoning. Kohlberg’s stages 1 through 4 were found in most cultures, but 
stages 5 and 6 that are regarded as higher stages were found to be in artificially 
lower placements (Heubner and Garrod, 1993; Snarey, 1985). In addition, it is 
found that individuals from middle-class industrialized environments tend to have 
higher endpoints on moral stages than people living in non-industrialized 
environments (Edwards, 1982, 1986; Snarey 1985). First of all, not all the cultures 
need complex reasoning about justice, since their social practices or daily 
regulatory mechanisms might be simpler. Therefore, the sequence and 
irreversibility of the stages were questioned together with the universalistic 
perspective. This resulted in realization of the need for many new studies from 
cultural perspective. Kohlberg in this sense inspired a new movement for moral 
development.   
 Cultural psychologists believe that morality is culturally variable and 
moral issues are beyond harm, rights, or justice (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). In 
the search for cross cultural roots of morality, Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood (1990) 
compared American and Indian participants’ moral reasoning in hypothetical 
situations. The results showed that the decision to help friends and strangers in 
different situations was seen as a personal choice for North Americans while for 
almost all Indians  it was seen as a moral obligation to offer help. Another 
research conducted by Miller and Luthar (1989) was designed as a cross cultural 
study in which American and Indian subjects’ evaluations and rule categorizations 
for 14 everyday incidents were interpreted. It was found that Indians are more 
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likely to use their moral code in the incidents and categorize role-related 
interpersonal responsibilities as moral issues than Northern American participants, 
who see those responsibilities as a right to choose one’s own action. This study is 
in line with Shweder & Bourne’s (1982) study in which separating behavior from 
its context was perceived to be more frequent in Western cultures than relation 
oriented cultures, such as India, where people’s conceptions and ideas were found 
to be more occasion-bound. Shweder, as a cultural anthropologist put emphasis on 
social duties, obligations and religious structures which was missing in 
Kohlberg’s theory (Sunar, 2009). Both of these studies have a great importance in 
supporting cross-cultural differences in moral reasoning.  
 
1.3.1. The Three Ethics Approach 
  
Shweder et al. (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987) in search for the 
relationship between cultural experiences and moral development, demonstrated 
that the development of understanding of obligations were different than 
Kohlberg’s theory. It was found that a broad range of social practices were 
considered as moral issues and these moral issues were seen as moral obligations 
by Indian participants which was not the case for American participants. 
American participants judged the same moral issues as social conventions unlike 
Indian participants. For example, for Indian participants, it is wrong if a woman 
whose husband has died wears bright clothes whereas, for American participants, 
it is not morally wrong and it is her right to do so. As a result of these, Shweder et 
al. (1987) concluded that some members in one culture can interpret one case as 
morally wrong; another culture can interpret the same case as harmless; and 
another culture can interpret it as unjust. Therefore, moral appraisals can differ 
from culture to culture as well as from person to person. Also, moral appraisals 
can be different in different historical periods. All these culture based, plural, 
unique understandings of morality provided a basis for a new system that will 
bring cultural particularities into harmony by classifying moral codes into three 
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domains; autonomy, community and divinity (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & 
Park, 1997). 
 This three domain theory is also called the “Big Three” of Morality or the  
CAD triad hypothesis in which the letters are the initials of; community (C), 
autonomy (A), and divinity (D). Shweder proposed a new theory of morality 
(Shweder et al., 1997) where each culture can have a unique mix of three moral 
codes. These ethics are defined as follows: autonomy ethic is based on individual 
rights and preferences; community ethic reflects duties and traditions stemming 
from interdependence within a collective structure; and divinity ethic is concerned 
with spirituality, purity and sacredness. To examine in detail, ethics of autonomy 
resembles Turiel’s moral domain which puts emphasis on harm, rights, and justice 
(Haidt et al., 1993). This is because the autonomous self is restricted by the 
concern for not harming anyone. This ethical code is important for legal systems 
and is prominent mostly in Western secular societies. 
 In addition, ethics of autonomy puts emphasis on the effort for fulfillment 
of needs, achieving goals, being aware of one’s needs, taking responsibilities, and 
making choices (Jensen, 2011). However, Shweder with his new formulation as a 
cultural anthropologist proposed two other ways that people perceive morality; 
suggesting that morality is not unitary, but plural. The universalist structure paints 
a monistic picture in which morality was ranked in stages, and differences in 
cultures were seen as superficial, while moral pluralism accepts that there is more 
than one true and mature morality (Shweder & Haidt, 1993). 
 To continue with other moral codes, ethics of community requires 
thinking about duty, hierarchy, obedience to authority, loyalty, protection, 
interdependence, social roles, preservation of community, and respect (Rozin, 
Lowery, Haidt, & Imada, 1999). Finally, the ethic of divinity is concerned with 
sacredness of God, whether a person causes impurity, whether an action is right or 
wrong, whether the soul is protected, whether a person commits sin. In this moral 
code, self is seen as a spiritual entity trying to achieve purity and sanctity. Also, 
bodily practices are taken to be very important. This ethic in conceptualizing self 
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as divine entity does not necessarily suit Western societies. However, it is highly 
involved in Hindu rules (Fuller, 1992).  
 To put it briefly, for Shweder, morality is not limited to the single domain 
of autonomy (justice, fairness and harm) as in early Western theories, but rather it 
is broader in different cultures. Also, for him, every culture possesses a unique 
approach to solving moral issues that can be assessed in the three ethics 
framework with different degrees of elaboration. In analyzing cross-cultural 
similarities and differences in thinking, practices, emotions and morality, Shweder 
deepened the theories of cultural psychology.  
 
1.3.2. Cultural Developmental Approach  
 
 Lene Arnett Jensen (2015) extended Shweder’s Big Three of Morality by 
exploring new empirical and theoretical dimensions for moral development in a 
global world.  She developed a “cultural-developmental approach” (Jensen, 2008, 
2011, 2012) in which she introduced an account of cultural differences in using 
the three ethics across different periods of life. She aims to examine human 
development with respect to universal and cultural components. Her studies 
mostly focus on moral development and cultural identity formation in the “culture 
war” tensions, globalization and migration (Jensen, 2015). In researching these 
issues, Jensen and her colleagues conducted studies in many different countries 
such as Denmark, Turkey, Thailand, India, and United States. Then, she presented 
series of comparative studies of moral development in her book Moral 
Development in a Global World: Research from a Cultural-Developmental 
Perspective. This book also includes many empirical and theoretical studies on 
the “Big Three” from all around the world.  
 For Jensen (2015), the cultural developmental approach was not a one-
size-fits-all-model but it is an approach built on large sets of findings from 
different traditions like cognitive-developmental model (e.g. Kohlberg, 1984; 
Piaget, 1932), domain theory (e.g. Turiel, 1983), procultural psychology and 
anthropological stance on morality (e.g. Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990) and 
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studies of moral emotions (e.g. Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt, 1999). 
Therefore, these findings were integrated in order to improve cultural-
developmental approach.    
 Bloom (2013) discusses that babies may be moral, however they are not 
uniquely diverse in their moralities yet. However, unlike babies, adults from 
different cultures are uniquely diverse. In this respect, the cultural developmental 
approach bridges cultural and universal perspectives. As mentioned above, Jensen 
bases her research on the “Big Three of Morality” and this provides a template for 
a cultural developmental approach. Studies have shown that these three ethics 
vary with age (developmental approach) and cultural groups (cultural approach). 
This is why Jensen (2008) calls her theory a “cultural-developmental approach”. 
Many studies have supported this variation in diverse samples (Arnett, Ramos, & 
Jensen, 2001; Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Jensen, 
1997a, 1997b, 1998, 2008; Padilla-Walker & Jensen, 2016; Rozin, Lowery, 
Imada, et al., 1999; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, et al., 2001). Therefore, 
differences in the degree of use in three ethics have been supported by many 
studies. For instance, in some cultures the use of Ethic of Divinity might go down 
as individuals’ age, whereas in another culture its use might increase. 
Furthermore, since each culture will have a unique representation, wording, and 
concepts for each domain of morality, the way it is measured across different ages 
and culture will vary. Hence, it is difficult to provide a manual for coding 
morality or a questionnaire to place each person into subcategories of three ethics. 
Jensen (2015) analyzed earlier researches and suggested a standard coding for 
three ethics which also provided coding of a person’s moral reasons.    
 Although a majority of studies involve interviews and coding of oral 
discourse, three questionnaires have been developed in order to assess the degree 
and type of usage of the “Big Three of Morality” (Jensen, 2015). Firstly, the 
Community, Autonomy and Divinity Scale (CADS) asks for the importance of 
different bases for judging an action as right or wrong (Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 
2010). Secondly, The Ethical Values Assessment (EVA) is a questionnaire that 
measures the extent to which participants endorse value statements related to the 
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three ethics (Padilla-Walker & Jensen, 2016). Thirdly, The Three Ethics 
Reasoning Assessment (TERA) assesses moral reasoning in specific issues such as 
abortion, suicide, and divorce (Jensen, 2015).   
 
1.3.3. Empirical Literature 
 
  Many studies have been conducted in the search for the three ethics. 
Jensen (1998) investigated moral reasoning among religiously conservative and 
religiously liberal groups in India and United States.  She conducted in-depth 
interviews with participants and found that the three ethics were useful in 
examining religious conservatism and liberalism. Furthermore, this study, along 
with other studies, strengthened the idea that “diverse people in diverse countries 
use all three ethics” (Jensen, 2011). Although different groups used the three 
ethics to various extents, participants both recognized and used all three ethics. 
Since moral ethics were widely recognized and used, Jensen suggested a model 
(Figure 1.1) showing the age trends related to the degree and type of use of the 
three ethics based on empirical researches.  
 Although available evidence for the cultural-developmental template can 
be improved, a descriptive model is helpful to understand which ethics are 
fundamental to people and how those ethics develop across the lifespan. 
According to Jensen (2011), the Ethic of Autonomy is predicted to stay 
“relatively” stable from childhood to adulthood. Yet, the type of autonomy 
reasoning is likely to change with age. This idea derives from studies in which it 
is found that children in different cultures can emphasize harm to self-interest or 
to self (Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1984; Turiel, 2002; Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & 
Lieberman, 1983; Walker, 1989) together with harm to other individuals and 
interests of other individuals (Carlo, 2006; Gilligan, 1982; Warneken & 
Tomasello, 2006). 
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Figure 1.1 The cultural-developmental template of moral reasoning (From 
Jensen, L.A., [2011]. The cultural-developmental theory of moral psychology: A 
new synthesis. In L.A. Jensen (Ed.) Bridging cultural and developmental 
psychology: New syntheses in theory, research, and policy [pp. 2-25] New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press.) 
Note. Each line indicates developmental patterns across life span from childhood 
to adulthood and lines do not show the frequency of ethics. For instance, 
Community is not more frequent than Divinity.  
 
 Furthermore, Jensen and McKenzie (2016) stated that as children grow 
into adolescence and adulthood in different cultures, it was found that some 
specific type of autonomy reasoning, such as consideration of one’s own welfare 
and others, will remain (Eisenberg, Carlo, Murphy, & Van Court, 1995; Gilligan, 
1982; Jensen, 1995; Vasquez et al., 2001; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 
1995; Zimba, 1994). There is also some evidence on adolescents and adults giving 
consideration to rights and equity (Killen, 2002; Miller & Luthar, 1989; Piaget, 
1932; Snarey, 1985; Zimba, 1994) however, it needs to be improved with new 
studies in diverse cultures and contexts.  Therefore, this developmental trajectory 
indicates stability of autonomy reasoning across the lifespan. Jensen (2015) also 
noted that autonomy reasoning might not be stable in collectivistic cultures due to 
the possible force on submission to divinity and push for collectivity which may 
result in a decrease of autonomy reasoning.   
 The Ethic of Community, in the cultural developmental approach is 
predicted to rise across the lifetime starting from childhood. To support this idea, 
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Jensen (2015) emphasized the findings that supported the idea that young children 
living in different cultures can reason in terms of community ethics such as family 
interests and customs (Kohlberg, 1984; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Olson 
& Spelke, 2008; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). Then, as children grow up 
and become a part of other social groups (Whiting & Edwards, 1988) such as 
peers and authority figures in places like school or work (Schlegel, 2011), new 
types of reasoning regarding the community ethic is needed as children’s social 
circles widen and duties to others increase. Findings also support the idea that the 
use of the ethic of community is likely to increase because focus on societal 
organizations increases (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Eisenberg et al., 2002; Nisan, 
1987; Walker, 1989; Zimba, 1994) by late adolescence to adulthood.  
 Jensen (2015) proposed that the ethic of Divinity will be low in childhood 
and then it will rise in adolescence and continue at a similar level in adulthood. It 
was found that moral behaviors were often expressed in divinity terms by adults 
(Colby & Damon, 1992) involving adults living in relatively secular communities 
(McAdams et al., 2008). The important thing regarding the Ethic of Divinity is 
that there were fewer studies available. However, in Jensen’s book of Moral 
Development in a Global World it is seen that some cases pay particular attention 
to the ethic of Divinity as a subdomain of moral thinking. Still, more studies are 
needed to explain and discover the types of divinity reasons used in order to 
understand the moral developmental change across lifetime. It is also important to 
note that Jensen (2011) asserted that the age pattern proposed in Figure 1.1 may 
only apply to some cultures because each culture has a unique way of connecting 
with god or god-like supernatural or transcendent entities. In brief, the cultural 
developmental model is not a one-size-fits-all model but rather it is dependent on 
cultures and contexts.  
 All in all, more recently, the concept of morality has been transformed by 
new concepts, theories and models. This research, empirically investigates one of 
these newer ideas, namely Shweder’s moral domain theory, in Turkish 
adolescents. The focus is on adolescents since it is a significant phase for the 
development of moral reasoning. Adolescence is an important period of life where 
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adolescents face critical phases like identity formation and emotional preparation 
for adult roles (Jensen, 2012). It is also important for forming personal ideologies 
and worldviews (Arnett, 1997; Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001). Adolescents at 
this distinct phase strive to fulfill their developmental potential, personal agency, 
social independence and social accountability (Curtis, 2015; Greenfield, Keller, 
Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003; Graber & Brookes-Gunn, 1996; Modell & Goodman, 
1990; Steinberg, 2002). The cultural meaning of adolescence may express 
different meanings in collectivist and individualist cultures (Zimmer-Gembeck & 
Collins, 2003). So, this transitional life stage between childhood and ‘emerging 
adulthood’ is dynamic and it takes different forms regarding cultural, economic, 
historical and social contexts (Arnett, 2011; Larson, Wilson, & Rickman, 2009; 
Steinberg, 2002; Swanson et al., 2003).  
The major aim of the study is to carry out an empirical research 
investigating the moral development of adolescents in Turkey from the point of 
view of Shweder’s cultural theory of morality (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & 
Park, 1997) and Lene Arnett Jensen’s (2015) application of that theory to 
adolescent development.  This developmental-cultural framework proposes three 
ethics (Autonomy, Community and Divinity) that may vary across cultures and 
across the lifespan. These ethics are defined as follows: the Autonomy ethic is 
based on individual rights and preferences; the Community ethic reflects duties 
and traditions stemming from interdependence within a collective structure; and 
the Divinity ethic is concerned with spirituality, purity and sacredness.  Jensen 
(2015) found that the three domains gain prominence at different ages in 
childhood in U.S., but she has not specifically studied age-wise changes during 
adolescence, and up to now age-related development in this model has not been 
investigated cross-culturally.  
Even so, there are studies conducted with adolescents from cultural 
developmental perspective in the search for cultural diversity. For example, 
Vainio (2015) compared nonreligious, liberal religious and conservative religious 
Finnish adolescents on how they define and reason about morality from a cultural 
developmental vantage point.  She found that conservative participants used the 
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ethic of Divinity more than nonreligious and liberal religious participants, 
whereas nonreligious and liberal adolescents used the ethic of Autonomy 
significantly more than conservative adolescents. In addition, it was found that the 
ethic of Community is more commonly used by nonreligious and liberal religious 
adolescents. This study is important for focusing on the relationship between 
religion and moral reasoning.  
Another study that examined the moral reasoning of adolescents and 
adults was conducted by Kapadia and Bhangaokar (2015). This study investigated 
the presence of the three ethics and the connection between them in Indian 
contexts from a cultural developmental perspective. In comparing adolescent and 
adult responses to everyday social-moral hypothetical dilemmas, it was found that 
the use of the ethic of Autonomy was higher among adolescents than adults, 
whereas the use of the ethic of Community was higher among adults than 
adolescents (Kapadia & Bhangaokar, 2015). It was also found that adults used the 
ethic of Divinity more than adolescents. This study is important for its emphasis 
on the developmental perspective. It is also important for providing evidence for 
the effect of familism and collectivity in the use of ethics.   
Lastly, Guerra and Giner-Sorolla (2010) studied the endorsement of the 
three ethics across five national samples (Brazil, Israel, Japan, New Zeland, and 
the United Kingdom) of emerging adults. Results of the study supported Shweder, 
Much, Mahapatra, and Park’s (1997) idea that the three ethics were endorsed and 
they are widespread.  This proposal is also in line with previous studies on 
cultural and developmental differences (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Jensen, 
1998; Rozin, Lowery, Imada et. al., 1999; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra et al., 
1997; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach et al., 2001). Regarding the three ethics; the 
ethic of Autonomy was found to be endorsed most highly, whereas the ethic of 
Community had the second highest level of endorsement, and the ethic of Divinity 
as the least endorsed moral code (Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). Also, with 
respect to age, the use of the ethic of Community and Divinity were found to be 
stable for groups across different countries while the use of the ethic of Divinity 
was found to be lower for older participants. This cross-cultural study is important 
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for emphasizing the cultural aspect of Jensen’s (2011, 2012) cultural-
developmental model of moral reasoning.  
 
1.4. THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
 The proposed study investigates the development of moral worldviews of 
adolescents in Turkey according to the cultural developmental model, and the 
results will contribute to the interpretation of differences in moral reasoning from 
a cultural and developmental perspective.  In brief, a cultural-developmental 
model suggests that the use of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity ethics will 
vary across different age groups showing that ethics develop in varied ways in 
different cultures (Jensen, 2008, 2011, 2015).  This study aims to search for the 
degree to which each ethic (Autonomy, Community, Divinity) is used at different 
ages throughout adolescence, specifically in four groups (12-13 years, Group 1; 
14-15 years, Group 2; 16-17 years, Group 3; and 18-29 years, Group 4) in 
responding to the Ethical Values Assessment (EVA). 
 A further research question is whether adolescent moral development, as 
defined in the three-ethics model, is affected by religious education (whether or 
not students have taken any special religious course outside of school) and how 
much time they spend on religious practices in their everyday lives. Whether or 
not the age differences in terms of the three ethics is related to religious education 
and daily practice will also be examined. 
 Results of the study will contribute to (1) understanding how moral values 
develop across adolescence; (2) understanding the relation between religious 
training and the development process; (3) understanding the relation between 
religious practice and the development process; (4) understanding cross-cultural 
similarities and differences in the development process, by comparing data from 
this study with previous studies done in the U.S. and other countries 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
 
2.1. PARTICIPANTS  
 
Participants of this study were 315 students (157 females) aged between 
12 and 29. They were from four different groups; Group 1 (12-13 year-olds), 
Group 2 (14-15 year-olds), Group 3 (16-17 year-olds), and Group 4 (18-29 year-
olds). 23 of them were excluded because they (1) did not state their gender, (2) 
did not answer the question about religious education, (3) did not answer the 
question about how frequently they engage in religious activities on a daily basis, 
or (4) did not answer all questions of the EVA questionnaire. After the exclusion 
of 23 participants, there were a total of 292 participants (154 female) again aged 
between 12 and 29 (M = 16.78, SD = 3.58).  
 
Table 2.1  
Distribution of Age and Gender in the Sample  
                   Gender 
Age groups Female Male 
Group 1 35 (50.00%) 35 (50.00%) 
Group 2 32 (44.00%) 40 (56.00%) 
Group 3 33 (45.00%) 41 (55.00%) 
Group 4 54 (71.00%) 22 (29.00%) 
Total 154 (53.00%) 138 (47.00%) 
 
Note. Group 1 represents 12-13 year-olds, 7th graders (n: 70). Group 2 represents 14-15 
year-olds, 9th graders (n: 72). Group 3 represents 16-17 year-olds, 11th graders (n: 74). 
Group 4 represents 18 to 30 year-olds, university students (n: 76). (N: 292). 
 
 Demographic characteristic of the participants are presented in Table 2.1. 
Gender distribution was relatively balanced except for Group 4. Group 1 was 
recruited from a public middle school and Group 2 and 3 were recruited from two 
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public high schools in the Maltepe district of Istanbul during the spring semester 
of 2018-2019 academic year. All consenting students in the available classes were 
included in the study. Group 4 were volunteers from psychology courses at 
Istanbul Bilgi University who participated in exchange for partial course credit. 
Before collecting the data, a statistical power analysis was performed in G*Power 
for sample size estimation with an alpha = .05 and power = 0.80; the sample size 
needed with this effect size (GPower 3.1 or other software) is approximately N = 
256 for this simplest between group comparison. Therefore, 292 participants were 
adequate for the main objective of this study. 
 
2.2. INSTRUMENTS 
 
Demographic Information Form. The form included month and year of 
birth; gender; grade in school; whether participant has taken any special religious 
course (yes or no), and how much time participants spend on their religious 
practices in a day as a multiple choice question (Never, Less than one hour per 
day, More than one hour per day, or I am constantly engaged in these activities). 
The Demographic Information Form was administered following the completion 
of the EVA, to prevent any priming. Furthermore, for the question asking whether 
participants have taken any religious course besides schools, religious course 
examples were added by the question such as Kur-an Course, Alpha Course, 
Catechism Course, Torah Education, Semah Education, Sufi Education, Islamic 
Ethics Course, Risale-i Nur Course.  
 Etik Değerler Ölçeği (EVA). Dr. Jensen and Padilla Walker (2016) 
assessed Three Ethics of Autonomy, Community and Divinity with the 
questionnaire EVA: Ethical Values Assessment. Cronbach’s alpha values for each 
of the three ethics have ranged from about .80 to .95 (Jensen, 2019). The long 
form of this questionnaire (EVA_L) was used in this research in order to assess 
the importance attributed to various ethical values among adolescents and Group 
4. Participants were asked to rate the importance of moral values (“What moral 
values do you think are important to how you should live at this time in your 
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life?”). The scale consists of 18 items answered in a 5-point Likert format ranging 
from 1(not at all important) to 5 (Completely Important). The original scale 
yielded high levels of Cohen’s Kappa inter-rater reliability assessments ranging 
from about .80 to .95 (Jensen, 2019). This Scale was translated into Turkish by 
Ayfer Dost Gözkan as Etik Değerler Ölçeği (EDÖ) (Jensen, 2019). 
 
2.3. PROCEDURE 
 
Initially, necessary ethical approval from Istanbul Bilgi University 
Committee on Ethics in research on Humans (see Appendix A) and permission 
from National Directorate of İstanbul were obtained (see Appendix B). For 7th, 
9th, and 11th grade students the directors of schools were contacted and informed 
about the purpose and the procedure of the study by the researcher. As directors 
agreed to collaborate, teachers of the classrooms and guidance counselor were 
also informed about the study. Next, consent letters to parents (see Appendix C) 
were sent with arbitrary identifying numbers on them. In the informed consent 
forms for both parents and participants, the fact that participation would be 
anonymous was clearly explained.  The question regarding birth date only asks for 
month and year, so it is not possible to identify a student through birth date. 
Likewise, it is stated in the consent forms that the participant can decline to 
participate or withdraw at any time without penalty, and this information was 
repeated orally when beginning the procedure.  
After the approval of parents, students’ informed consent was also 
obtained (see Appendix D). Lastly, the purpose of the study was explained by the 
researcher and questionnaires were distributed in the classroom with numbers 
matching numbers on the consent forms.  
 The survey consisted of EVA and Demographic Information Form. The 
survey was completed during counseling hours, with the supervision of the 
classroom teacher and the principal investigator. Since some of the questions 
pertain to personal attitudes and values, as well as experiences, it was clearly 
explained to the students that their answers are entirely voluntary.  Furthermore, 
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since the questionnaires were filled out in a classroom setting, the students were 
asked not to discuss their answers with one another during the procedure. 
Students’ questions were answered by the researcher at the beginning and during 
the administration of the questionnaire. Completion of the questionnaire took 
approximately 20-25 minutes. After completing the questionnaire, both students 
and teachers were thanked for their participation.  
 For Group 4, the questionnaire was presented online in Survey Monkey 
(www.surveymonkey.com). The link to the questionnaire, including both an 
informed consent statement and the EVA and Demographic Information Form 
were provided via e-mail to Bilgi University students enrolled in participating 
courses. In the consent form, participants were informed about the purpose and 
procedure of the study; about how long the questionnaire takes; about their right 
to quit at any point; about confidentiality of the data. After the approval of the 
Informed Consent Form, the survey was presented.  
 
2.4. DATA ANALYSIS PLAN 
 
 First, questionnaires with missing data were dropped from the sample. 
Then, a reliability analysis was conducted for the EVA measure. The internal 
consistency of the scale was measured using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
(Cronbach, 1951). A recent study which investigated the construct validity of the 
EVA scale has confirmed that it supports the three-factor model (Padilla-Walker 
& Jensen, 2016). For this reason, the construct validity of the scale was not 
carried out in the present study. Finally, a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was used to explore the effects on endorsements of the three ethics 
of age, religious education, and frequency of religious practice. The statistical 
software package SPSS (v20) was used to conduct all the analyses described 
above. The results of the analysis are described in detail in the following section. 
 
 
 
 28 
 
CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
 
3.1. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
3.1.1. Internal Reliability of the EVA Measure 
 
 The internal reliability of the EVA measure was assessed with the internal 
consistency coefficient Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951), testing the subscales 
for each ethic separately. The alpha coefficient was found .67 for Autonomy, .75 
for Community, and .87 for Divinity, showing that the EVA measure reached an 
acceptable level reliability (≥.70) in Community and Divinity and moderate 
reliability in Autonomy. One item (question 2) of Community and one item 
(question 9) of Divinity were found to increase the alpha by .015 and .008 if 
deleted, respectively. Since these increases were negligible, both items were 
retained in the EVA measure. 
 During the testing stage, some participants asked for additional 
explanation regarding some concepts mentioned in the EVA items, such as the 
concept of divinity or compass. This observation may point out the possibility that 
the EVA measure, or its translation into Turkish, was not equally comprehensible 
for people who were at different stages of adolescence. This consideration 
motivated the decision to test internal consistency for different age groups of the 
sample as well. Whether internal consistency differed as a function of gender was 
also examined. Table 3.1 presents the Cronbach’s alpha values for all subgroups 
of the sample.  In general the reliability levels were consistent across age groups, 
with the exception of somewhat lower reliability on the Autonomy subscale for 
adolescents in Group 3. 
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Table 3.1  
Cronbach’s alpha values for all subgroups of the sample 
 Gender Age group 
Ethic Female Male Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Autonomy .69 .67 .78 .71 .53 .69 
Community .80 .70 .75 .71 .73 .77 
Divinity .88 .85 .84 .87 .82 .88 
 
Note. Group 1 represents 12-13 year-olds, Group 2 represents 14-15 year-olds, Group 3 
represents 16-17 year-olds, and Group 4 represents 18-29 year olds.  
Generally, reliability levels were consistent across age groups. There was one exception 
of somewhat lower reliability on the Autonomy subscale regarding adolescents in Group 
3. 
 
3.1.2. Examination of the EVA Scores 
 
 For the EVA scores to be included in any analysis, they needed to be 
treated as measured at continuous level. Means of the scores given to the items of 
each ethic were calculated to be used as the dependent measures in the subsequent 
analyses. The ‘daily religious practice frequency’ variable was transformed into a 
2-level variable, because the number of people falling under half of its categories 
were too low. The resulting variable (i.e. religious practice) consisted of two 
levels, which were ‘engaged in religious practice’ and ‘not engaged in religious 
practice’. 43.2% of the sample reported no engagement in daily religious activities 
and with regard to religious education background, 47.9% of the participants 
reported to have received no education before. 
An examination of the EVA scores revealed that the participants reasoned 
in the ethic of Autonomy most (M = 4.31, SD = .54), with the ethics of 
Community (M = 3.97, SD = .66) and Divinity (M = 3.51, SD = .96) following. 
Table 3.2 shows the means and standard deviation of the three subscale scores 
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according to age level, and presence or absence of religious practice and religious 
education.  
 
Table 3.2  
Means and Standard Deviations of Scores in Each Ethic Subscale by Age, Religious 
Practice, and Religious Education 
   Age Groups 
Religious 
practice 
Religious 
education 
Ethic Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Engaged 
Received 
Autonomy 4.55 (.38) 4.38 (.56) 4.23 (.53) 4.10 (.63) 
Community 4.31 (.43) 4.19 (.62) 3.84 (.54) 3.85 (.77) 
Divinity 4.39 (.48) 3.97 (.86) 3.78 (.66) 3.75 (.93) 
Not received 
Autonomy 4.27 (.52) 4.29 (.64) 4.33 (.51) 4.35 (.61) 
Community 4.10 (.57) 4.31 (.72) 3.80 (1.09) 3.62 (.73) 
Divinity 3.99 (.80) 4.01 (.98) 3.22 (.94) 3.67 (.83) 
Not engaged 
Received 
Autonomy 3.33 (.58) 3.62 (.64) 4.32 (.46) 4.47 (.42) 
Community 3.33 (.49) 3.83 (.57) 3.84 (.60) 3.93 (.78) 
Divinity 3.25 (.52) 3.10 (.67) 3.04 (.92) 2.62 (.94) 
Not received 
Autonomy 4.42 (.56) 4.25 (.55) 4.33 (.44) 4.40 (.44) 
Community 3.83 (.76) 3.99 (.51) 4.06 (.58) 3.63 (.64) 
Divinity 3.73 (1.14) 3.00 (.67) 2.94 (.54) 2.75 (.72) 
 
Note. Group 1 represents 12-13 year-olds, Group 2 represents 14-15 year-olds, Group 3 
represents 16-17 year-olds, and Group 4 represents 18-29 year olds. 
The numbers in parentheses represent the standard deviation values. 
For religious education; participants received religious education (n: 152) and 
participants did not receive religious education (n: 140). For religious practice; 
participants who engaged in daily religious activities (n: 166) and participants who was 
not engaged in religious activities (n: 126).  N: 292. 
 
 To answer the research questions of the present study, a three-way 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was planned to be conducted on the 
mean scores of the EVA measure with the factors of age, religious education 
background, and religious practice as independent variables. Before conducting 
the MANOVA, all dependent measures were examined for correlations to test the 
MANOVA assumption that the dependent measures are moderately correlated 
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with each other. A series of Pearson’s correlation tests revealed moderate 
correlations between Autonomy and Community (r = .52, p < .001), between 
Autonomy and Divinity (r = .30, p < .001), and between Community and Divinity 
(r = .48, p < .001).  
 However, it was highly probable for two of the independent variables, 
religious education background and religious practice, to be correlated due to 
measuring similar constructs. Including correlated variables as independent 
measures would violate the ‘independence of observations’ assumption of 
MANOVA. A chi-square test of independence on these variables confirmed their 
association, X2 (1, 292) = 19.33, p < .001. Those who received a religious 
education were more likely to engage in religious practice than those who did not 
received any religious education. Hence, these two variables were decided to be 
examined in two separate MANOVAs. This decision could also help to see if one 
of these variables explains more variance in the data than the other one could. 
 
3.2. MEAN DIFFERENCES  
 
 MANOVA 1. To answer the questions about whether ethical values vary 
across different ages of adolescence and whether ethical values are associated 
with having a religious education background, a two-way (4 x 2) MANOVA was 
conducted on the average scores obtained on the three ethics (Autonomy, 
Community, and Divinity) with the factors age and religious education as 
independent variables. 
 The assumption of ‘multivariate normality’ was checked by performing 
Shapiro-Wilks tests of normality on each dependent measure. These tests resulted 
in the violation of normality in all measures (all ps < .001). F tests are robust to 
normality violations when the sample size is large enough. The present study had 
a very large sample size; therefore, it was assumed that the MANOVA would not 
be affected by the violated normality in the dependent measures. The Box’s M 
value of 84.85 with a p value of less than .001 suggested the violation of the 
‘homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices’ assumption, stating that the 
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observed covariance matrices of the dependent variables were equal across 
groups. As an additional check, Levene’s test of Equality of Error Variances 
revealed that the equal variances assumption was violated only in the ethic of 
Divinity (p = .006). As the Box’s M and Levene’s test can be sensitive to large 
samples, a final check was made with a Spread-versus-Level plot of Divinity for 
visual confirmation of the violation. Spread-versus-Level plots are scatterplots of 
the cell means and standard deviations. The plot of Divinity demonstrated no 
meaningful pattern, providing no evidence for violation of the assumption. Hence, 
it was concluded that the assumption of homogeneity of variance-covariance 
matrices was met. 
 The combined outcome variables (i.e. the three ethics) were found to vary 
significantly between different age groups, Wilks’ Λ = .78, F(9, 686.46) = 8.12, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .08, and between those who received religious education and those 
who did not, Wilks’ Λ = .96, F(3, 282) = 3.98, p = .008, ηp2 = .04. There was no 
significant interaction between age and religious education, p = .24. 
 Separate univariate ANOVAs on the outcome variables revealed a main 
effect of age on the ethics of Community, F(3, 284) = 5.30, p = .001, ηp2 = .05. 
and Divinity, F(3, 284) = 19.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, but not Autonomy (p = .54). 
The main effect of religious education was present only for the ethic of Divinity, 
F(1, 284) = 9.78, p = .002, ηp2 = .03. Those who had a religious education 
background scored higher than those who did not in the ethic of Divinity. 
Bonferroni’s post-hoc tests were conducted to follow up the significant 
effect of age. With regard to the ethic of Community, the Group 1 and Group 2 
were found to have obtained significantly higher scores than the Group 4 did (p = 
.009 and p = .004, respectively). In the ethic of Divinity, Group 1 had 
significantly higher scores than the other age groups: Group 2 (p = .013), Group 3 
(p < .001), and in Group 4 (p < .001). Also, the participants in the Group 2 scored 
higher than the Group 4, p < .001. 
 MANOVA 2. A second two-way (4 x 2) MANOVA was conducted on the 
average scores obtained on the three ethics with the factors age and religious 
practice as independent variables. 
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 Similar to the previous MANOVA, it was again assumed that the analysis 
would be robust to the violated normality due to the very large sample size of the 
present study. The Box’s M value of 78.57 with a p value of less than .001 
suggested violation of the homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices 
assumption, stating that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent 
variables were equal across groups. As an additional check, Levene’s test of 
Equality of Error Variances revealed that the equal variances assumption was 
violated only in the ethic of Autonomy (p = .02). Since Box’s M and Levene’s 
test can be sensitive to large samples, a final check was made with a Spread-
versus-Level plot of Autonomy for visual confirmation of the violation. The plot 
of Autonomy demonstrated no meaningful pattern, providing no evidence for 
violation of the assumption. Hence, it was concluded that the homogeneity of 
variance-covariance matrices assumption was met. 
 The outcome variables (i.e., the three ethics) varied significantly both 
across different age groups, Wilks’ Λ = .86, F(9, 686.46) = 5.04, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.05, and between those who engaged in religious practice and those who did not, 
Wilks’ Λ = .80, F(3, 282) = 23.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. There was also a 
significant interaction between age and religious practice, Wilks’ Λ = .92, F(9, 
686.46) = 2.57, p = .007, ηp2 = .03. 
 Separate univariate ANOVAs on the outcome variables revealed that the 
main effect of age was present only for the ethics of Community, F(3, 284) = 
3.27, p = .022, ηp2 = .03, and Divinity, F(3, 284) = 8.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .08.  The 
main effect of religious practice too was present only for the ethics of 
Community, F(3, 284) = 4.54, p = .034, ηp2 = .02, and Divinity, F(3, 284) = 
67.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. The interaction between age and religious practice was 
observed only in the ethics of Autonomy, F(3, 284) = 3.59, p = .014, ηp2 = .04 , 
and Community, F(3, 284) = 3.08, p = .028, ηp2 = .03. 
 Bonferroni’s post-hoc tests were conducted to follow up the significant 
effects of age and religious practice on endorsement of the three ethics. With 
regard to the effect of age, the Group 2 was found to have significantly higher 
scores than the Group 4 did in the Community ethic (p = .014) whereas the Group 
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Figure 3.1 Average scores for Three Ethics among adolescents 
Note. Lines showing the average scores for Three Ethics according to different age groups in adolescents.  ‘Received’ and ‘not received’ represent 
whether participants received and religious education. ‘Engaged’ and ‘not engaged’ represent whether participants engage in religious practices or not. 
Group 1 represents 12-13 year-olds, Group 2 represents 14-15 year-olds, Group 3 represents 16-17 year-olds, and Group 4 represents 18-29 year-olds.  
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1 was found to have significantly higher scores than all three of the other age 
groups: Group 2 (p = .038), Group 3 (p < .001) and Group 4 (p < .001) in the 
Divinity ethic. Regarding the religious practice effect, those who engaged in 
religious practice were found to have significantly higher scores than those who 
did not in the ethics of Community (p = .034) and Divinity (p < .001). 
 
CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The cultural-developmental approach introduced by Jensen (2008) brings 
cultural and developmental perspectives together. This approach takes its roots 
from Shweder’s theories on developmental model of three ethics (Autonomy, 
Community, and Divinity) across different cultures (Shweder, Mahapatra, & 
Miller, 1987). The present study makes contribution to the moral psychology 
literature by specifically examining the development of morality throughout 
adolescence in Turkey. Earlier cross-cultural studies that were presented in 
Jensen’s book of Moral Development in a Global World revealed differences in 
the use of three ethics across cultures (e.g., Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2015; 
Kapadia & Bhangaokar, 2015; Pandya & Bhangaokar, 2015). However, these 
studies do not provide detailed information on the use of ethics among different 
ages of adolescence in the use of three ethics. This study aimed to fill this gap by 
providing evidence from a different culture and developmental period that have 
not been investigated much with regard to moral development. Therefore, this 
study focused on the use of the three ethics (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, et al., 
1997) in Turkish culture among different age groups of adolescents. 
In addition to the major goal to explore whether there are age trends in the 
three ethics, this study also investigated whether religious education and religious 
practice are related to endorsement of the ethics. Previous work on the 
development of moral reasoning implied that moral reasoning and development, 
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especially in the the ethic of Divinity, and religious conservatism may be linked 
(e.g., Jensen, 2011). Similarly, the possibility of a link between moral 
development and religious education or religious practice was sought out as well. 
Jensen (2011) stated that in cultures where people believe in an omnipotent, 
supernatural, omniscient God, the degree of use of ethic of Divinity will be low 
among children and it will rise in adolescence. She believes that (Jensen, 2011) 
when the culturally articulated concept of God is largely distinct from humans, its 
abstract nature is emphasized and this abstract nature can be translated into moral 
reasoning when the cognitive ability for abstraction develops in adolescence 
(Adelson, 1971; Keating, 1990; Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1972). Since the majority 
of the population in Turkey identify themselves as Muslim (Cukur, De Guzman, 
& Carlo, 2004), the present study investigated whether the monotheistic cultural 
roots of Turkey are related to endorsement of the three ethics. Consequently, the 
main objective of this study was to provide evidence regarding moral 
development from a cultural developmental perspective.  
First, it is important to stress that all three ethics were endorsed, as it can 
be seen from the mean scores of above “3” for each ethic. These results provide 
evidence from a Turkish cultural context regarding the prevalence of the three 
ethics in different cultures (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Jensen, 1998; Rozin, 
Lowery, Imada, et al., 1999; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, et al., 1997; Vasquez, 
Keltner, Ebenbach, et al., 2001). The overall pattern of endorsement of each ethic 
was found to be different from previous studies which investigated the three 
ethics in different countries (e.g., Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010, 2015; Kapadia & 
Bhangaokar, 2015), supporting the cultural aspect of Jensen’s cultural-
developmental perspective of moral reasoning (Jensen, 2008, 2011, 2012). The 
highest level of endorsement was found for the ethic of Autonomy. In earlier 
studies, this moral code was shown to be endorsed across cultures (Vauclair & 
Fischer, 2011) and this study provided evidence for the emphasis on the 
importance of the concepts such as justice and fairness in the ethic of Autonomy. 
Also, this finding is consistent with previous literature on the endorsement degree 
of the three ethics (e.g., Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2015; Jensen, 2011). Moreover, 
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the lowest level of endorsement was found to be the ethic of Divinity when 
compared with the ethics of Autonomy and Community. This finding is congruent 
with previous studies (e.g. Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2015; Kapadia & 
Bhangaokar, 2015) pointing out the lower use of ethic of Divinity in comparison 
to other ethics. 
 
4.2. HYPOTHESIS 
 
 With respect to the emphasis on the effect of age, an age trend across 
adolescence was expected in the use of three ethics consistent with Jensen’s 
cultural developmental model of moral reasoning (Jensen, 2008, 2011, 2012). The 
results revealed that there is an effect of age, confirming this hypothesis. In 
particular, age was found to influence the use of the ethics of Community and 
Divinity but not of Autonomy (See Figure 3.1 again). The extent of use of the 
ethic of Community slightly decreased throughout the adolescence. The ethic of 
Divinity, however, was found to be used more by adolescents in Group 1 than 
other age groups, and its extent of use lessened with age, reaching its minimum in 
adulthood. The decrease in the use of Divinity was more pronounced than that in 
the use of Community. Although the extent of using Community and Divinity 
changed with age, the overall pattern of using the ethic of Autonomy as the most 
and Divinity as the least were preserved regardless of age.  
 In brief, an effect of age was expected in the use of the three ethics across 
adolescence since this developmental period is characterized by identity formation 
(Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001), along with an increase in the awareness of the 
problems in society as well as ideologies and worldviews (Flanagan & Levine, 
2010), and gaining greater responsibility (Vainio, 2015). Yet, the findings were 
different from Jensen’s model regarding the ethic of Community and Divinity.  
 According to Jensen’s (2011) cultural developmental model, the ethic of 
Community increases with age whereas, in this sample, a decrease in the ethic of 
Community was observed. In addition, Jensen’s cultural developmental template 
proposes that ethic of Divinity will rise in adolescence (Jensen, 2011). However, 
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unlike Jensen’s model, a decrease in the ethic of Divinity was observed in this 
sample.  
 This difference from Jensen’s model is important as it provides 
information needed to understand the ethical values among young people in 
modern Turkey. Along with the studies explaining the intersection of cultural and 
developmental psychology (e.g., Kağıtçıbaşı, 1996), bridging those perspectives is 
the focus of interest of the present study in the search for cultural diversity 
(Jensen, 2011). The difference from Jensen’s model can be explained by the 
phases of adolescence, the characteristics of the sample and the cultural context of 
modern Turkey.  
First, the decline in the use of ethic of Divinity can be associated with the 
increase in the critical thinking capacity of adolescents. Arnett (2014) states that 
adolescents start to analyze information, relate that information with prior 
information, make judgments, and have a greater capacity for critical thinking 
with cognitive development in adolescence. Additionally, adolescents have more 
access to information resources, which supports the increase in their critical 
thinking. Media such as Internet, movies, and television increase the spread of 
ideas across cultures. Studies also showed that adolescents and emerging adults 
have more interest in media culture than children or adults (Dasen, 2000; 
Schlegel, 2011).  Adolescents can choose which information they want to reach in 
an objective manner with the changing global world. Along with the access to 
new information, adolescents might begin to question religious judgments which 
may result in decrease in the use of Divinity as a moral code. Hence, the age trend 
found in the present study might be distinctive on the basis of characteristics of 
developmental issues of adolescence.  
Secondly, the fact that the participants of this study are in an urban, 
educated environment which is dominated by a secular ideology might be one of 
the reasons for the decline in endorsement of divinity. Students taking secular 
education in an urban context may have different views of moral values than 
students undergoing similar education in a rural context.  
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In addition, the predominant worldview of Turkish culture is influential in 
explaining the difference with Jensen’s model. As Sunar and Fişek (2005) 
clarified, Turkish culture is classified as “collectivistic” (as defined by, e.g., 
Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). In 
collectivist cultures, the interest of the group is considered to be more important 
than the interests of individuals (Sunar & Fişek, 2005) and self is mostly 
conceptualized on the basis of relationships (Kağıtçıbaşı, 1985, 1996). Kağıtçıbaşı 
(1990, 1996) suggested a model where new modern Turkish family members 
become “autonomous-relational.” Although Turkish society tends to protect its 
characteristic of “relatedness”, there are studies that portray Turkish respondents 
as neither strongly collectivistic nor individualistic (Anamur, 1998; Göregenli, 
1995). Jensen’s (2008, 2011) model proposed an increase in the use of ethic of 
Community across lifespan. However, the results showed the opposite in which 
the use of the ethic of Community decreased in different age groups. This decline 
in the use of the ethic of Community may be due to the association between 
Community and Divinity (correlation with an r of .48) in Turkish culture; 
however, since the correlation coefficient between Community and Autonomy is 
nearly the same (r = .52), this is probably not the whole explanation.  
For the last century, Turkish society has struggled with the issue of 
religiosity versus secularism. With the establishment of the Republic in the 
1920’s, the Ottoman tradition of the ruler being also the spiritual head of Islam 
(caliph) was overturned and secularism became one of the defining legacies of 
Ataturk’s revolution.  Urban elites and the governing class promoted secularism 
and discouraged public displays of religiosity, outlawing the use of the traditional 
fez for men or the veil for women. Towards the turn of the 21st century, political 
parties began to mobilize around demands for rights of religious expression.  One 
of these parties, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won a series of 
elections and has been in power since 2002.  The resulting split between loyalists 
to the Kemalist position and those supporting the resurgence of public religiosity 
has been deep and stubborn, dividing the nation almost in half.  The split is 
especially acute between urban, educated coastal populations and rural, inland, 
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less educated populations.  The governing party has also increasingly embraced 
not only Islamism but also neoliberal economics coupled with progressively 
greater consolidation of political power in a more authoritarian structure (Kaya, 
2015; Yılmaz, Barton & Barry, 2017; see also Günay & Dzihic, 2016).  
Thus there are two competing visions with very different value systems, 
one of them rooted in the Republican legacy of secularism and modernization, and 
the other rooted in pro-religious, neoliberal and authoritarian values.  Not 
surprisingly, the government has established large numbers of religiously-oriented 
public high schools, and its supporters have likewise established many 
religiously-oriented private schools, as alternatives to the public and private 
schools established during the previous era, when secularism was the official 
policy.   
The schools from which the sample in this study was drawn are public 
schools that do not have a declared religious orientation.  Thus it is likely that the 
students in these schools come from families with leanings toward a more secular 
vision of society. At the same time, these students may have negative reactions to 
government actions they see as oppressive.  The decrease with age in the ethics of 
Community and Divinity in this group may be interpreted in light of these social 
divisions and the likely position of the participants within them. As the desire for 
independence increases through adolescence, social pressure may lead to a feeling 
of opposition and to a decrease in the use of Community and Divinity. 
 With regard to religious education and religious practice, differences 
between those who received religious education and those who did not, as well as 
those who engaged in religious practices and those who did not were expected. 
Religious education was found to be related only to the use of the ethic of 
Divinity, whereas religious practice was found to be related to the use of the 
ethics of both Community and Divinity. Those who received religious education 
used Divinity as a moral code more than those who did not receive any religious 
education outside of school. Yet, it is important to note that the size of this effect 
was small (ηp2 = .04). Furthermore, the participants who engaged in religious 
practices endorsed both the ethics of Community and Divinity more than those 
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who did not engage in religious practices, and this difference was more 
pronounced in the ethic of Divinity. These findings suggest that having a religious 
education background and engaging in religious practices both positively 
influence moral values, with the latter being more influential. This suggests that 
active involvement in religion (i.e.”religious practice”) may alter moral values, 
especially in the ethic of Divinity, more distinctively than having a religious 
education background (Durkheim, 1915, 1951, 1965; Graham & Haidt, 2010).  
 There was no interaction between age and religious education, meaning 
that the individuals who received religious education did not show any 
developmental differences in terms of their responses to moral values from those 
who did not receive any religious education. An interaction effect, however, was 
observed between age and religious practice, demonstrating different 
developmental patterns of moral values for those who engaged in religious 
practices and those who did not (see Figure 3.2 again). This interaction effect was 
present only for the ethics of Autonomy and Community. With regard to those 
who did not engage in religious practices, the level of endorsement in the ethic of 
Autonomy showed a trend of slight increase across the period of adolescence 
whereas the level of endorsement of the ethic of Community was the same 
throughout the adolescence. Those who engaged in religious practices, on the 
other hand, demonstrated a trend of slight decrease in both ethics during 
adolescence. However, it is important to note that these effects need to be 
considered carefully since their size were quite small (for Autonomy, ηp2 = .04; 
for Community, ηp2 = .03). 
 These findings contradict with Jensen’s findings of the interaction between 
age and religiosity in moral development (Buchanan 2003; Jensen 1997a; 1997b; 
1998; 2008; Vainio, 2003). Jensen (2011) reported an increase in the ethic of 
Community but stability in Autonomy and Divinity in religious liberals, compared 
to an increase in Divinity and Community but a decrease in Autonomy among 
religious conservatives. Contrary to Jensen, in the sample of this study, the ethic 
of Divinity decreased with age regardless of the religiosity of the participants. 
Again, contrary to Jensen (2015) who reported that Community would increase 
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with age regardless of religiosity of the individual, in the present study, 
Community decreased in those who engaged in religious practice but stayed fairly 
stable in those who did not. Furthermore, the developmental pattern found for the 
ethic of Autonomy in relation to religious practice was the opposite of what 
Jensen (2008, 2015) reported, that is, an increase in Autonomy with age in those 
who did not engage in religious practices whereas Autonomy remained fairly 
stable across different age groups in those who engaged in religious practices. 
A gradual decrease in the extent of using the ethic of Divinity was 
previously observed in the cultural contexts of Israel, New Zealand, and the 
United Kingdom in a cross-cultural study of moral reasoning by Guerra and 
Giner-Sorolla (2015), even though this decrease concerned a narrower time frame 
(18 to 23 years of age). This suggests that the effect of having a religious 
background or being actively involved in religious activities might differentially 
influence moral values across cultures. This might be due to the context-
dependent nature of religion. Religion is as diverse as cultures are and it varies 
widely among different cultural contexts. Just as not every culture is the same, not 
every religion is the same either. Religions vary and they can be differentiated 
within themselves. For example, there are many denominations in Islam and the 
views of different sects can be dramatically different from each other. Therefore, 
the diversity in religion might be influential in the use of the ethic of Divinity 
among adolescents. Still, the way Divinity develops over the course of 
adolescence in Turkey will require more research.  
Since cultural factors affect moral judgment and behavior, societal 
differences such as political ideology, cultural norms, demographic and economic 
factors have a great importance on the endorsement of moral codes (Graham, 
Meindl, Beall, Johnson, & Zhang, 2016). Turkey, an “institutionally secular, 
democratic state in which religious lifestyles have been ascendant within public 
sphere in the past decade (Gökarıksel & Secor, 2015)” brings Islamic values and 
neoliberal policies together. Secular and religious characteristics of Turkish 
society, social class (upper and lower) differences, and regional variations (rural 
and urban) shape cultural dynamics of Turkish culture. So, religion, Islamism, 
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everyday life in rural and urban areas, changes in educational attainment, income, 
preferences, and subjective social status become indicative in interpreting the use 
of ethics among Turkish adolescents. Consequently, the results of this study 
cannot be generalized to nonstudent adolescents in rural context since participants 
of this study were from urban, educated environment that is dominated by a 
secular ideology. 
As mentioned above, the present study aimed to empirically investigate 
patterns in the developmental trajectories of the three ethics (Autonomy, 
Community, and Divinity) in the light of Jensen’s (2008, 2011) cultural 
developmental approach in Turkish adolescents. The cultural developmental 
synthesis allows reflection on both developmental commonalities and cultural 
diversities. In this rapidly changing global world, it is important to discover 
cultural characteristics in moral development. Overall, it can be concluded that 
this study supports the use of the cultural developmental approach in 
understanding the differences of moral reasoning within a Turkish context.  
 
4.3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
With regard to limitations, although the EVA questionnaire is very helpful 
in capturing the variety of moral codes, adding indigenous Turkish moral features 
might be helpful. Moreover, it is believed that if the wording in the questionnaire 
such as “manevi pusula” and “manevi selamet” could be adapted to younger age 
groups, the questionnaire might be more valid for younger adolescents. 
Furthermore, there is a need to further explore and compare adolescents from 
different socioeconomic groups within Turkish culture. Many adolescents who 
participated in this study were from lower-middle, middle, and upper-middle 
classes of Turkish society. Also, for future studies longitudinal studies would 
yield a better understanding of how moral values develop across the lifespan. 
Lastly, further studies can be done in the search for the relationship between 
moral development and education, media, parenting styles, attachment, and 
psychological well-being. These studies will also be important for clinical 
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evaluations of therapists. Briefly, there is a need to specify moral concepts for 
younger age groups to understand and enrich the questionnaire with new culture-
specific concepts, new studies with more socioeconomically diverse samples, and 
further longitudinal examinations with new topics.  
 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
 
Finally, as mentioned above, although there are limitations, this study 
contributed to the growing literature using the cultural developmental template for 
understanding how moral values develop across adolescence; understanding the 
relation between religious training and religious practice in the developmental 
process; and understanding the cross-cultural similarities and differences in the 
developmental process.  
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Appendix C: Parental Consent Form 
 
 
Ebeveyn Onam Formu 
Sayın Veli, 
Çocuğunuzun İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi klinik psikoloji bölümü yüksek 
lisans öğrencisi Şebnem Erinç’in “Üç Farklı Yaş Grubundaki Ergenlerin Çeşitli 
Ahlaki Değerlere İlişkin Tutumlarındaki Farklılıkların Kültürel Gelişimsel 
Perspektiften İncelenmesi” konulu tez çalışmasında katılımcı olması 
istenmektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, ergenlerin çeşitli değerlere karşı tutumlarının 
farklı yaş grupları içinde nasıl değişiklik gösterdiğini gelişimsel olarak 
belirlemektir. Buna ek olarak din eğitimi ve pratiklerinin değerlere karşı 
tutumlarıyla ilişkisi araştırılacaktır. Bu çalışmaya yedinci, dokuzuncu ve on 
birinci sınıf öğrencisi olan bireyler katılabilecektir.  
Öğrenciler, yaklaşık 25-30 dakika sürecek olan anket formlarını bir ders 
saati içinde kendileri dolduracaklardır. Çocuğunuz eğer araştırmaya başlayıp 
katılmaya devam etmek istemezse, istediği yerde çalışmayı bırakma hakkı 
kendisine tanınacaktır.  
Katılımcı olarak çocuğunuzun adı-soyadı sorulmayacaktır ve 
kaydedilmeyecektir. Bu araştırmadan elde edilen bilgiler sadece grup olarak 
değerlendirilecektir. Bu çalışmaya katılım gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. 
Katılımdan kaynaklanabilecek herhangi bir zarar beklenmemektir. 
Çalışmayla ilgili sorularınız olursa araştırmacı Psk. Şebnem Erinç’e 536 
498 97 68 numaralı telefondan ya da sebnemerincc@gmail.com e-posta 
adresinden ya da çalışmanın danışmanı olan Prof. Dr. Diane Sunar’a 
diane.sunar@bilgi.edu.tr adresinden ulaşabilirsiniz. Araştırmaya değerli 
katkılarınız için şimdiden çok teşekkür ederim. 
 
Araştırmanın şartlarını okudum ve çocuğumun bu çalışmaya katılmasına izin 
veriyorum   ☐ 
Araştırmanın şartlarını okudum ve çocuğumun bu çalışmaya katılmasına izin 
vermiyorum ☐  
 
Tarih (gün/ay/yıl):........./.........../.............. 
İmza: ___________________________________________ 
 
Not: Bu formu işaretleyip imzaladıktan sonra kapalı zarfta öğretmene 
verilmesi rica olunur. İmzalı izin formları, öğrencilerin doldurduğu anket 
formlarından ayrı tutulacaktır. 
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Appendix D: Informed Consent Form 
 
Katılımcı Onam Formu 
Değerli Katılımcı, 
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi klinik psikoloji bölümü yüksek lisans öğrencisi 
Şebnem Erinç’in “Üç Farklı Yaş Grubundaki Ergenlerin Çeşitli Ahlaki Değerlere 
İlişkin Tutumlarındaki Farklılıkların Kültürel Gelişimsel Perspektiften 
İncelenmesi” konulu tez çalışmasına katılımınızı rica ediyorum. Bu çalışmanın 
amacı ergenlerin çeşitli değerler ile ilgili düşüncelerini anlamaktır. Özellikle, 
farklı yaş gruplarındaki ergenlerin bakışlarındaki farkların incelenmesi 
amaçlanmaktadır. Buna ek olarak din eğitimin ve pratiklerinin çeşitli değerlerle 
ilişkisi araştırılacaktır.  
Bu çalışmaya yedinci, dokuzuncu ve on birinci sınıf öğrencisi olan 
bireyler katılabilecektir. Formun doldurulması yaklaşık yarım saat sürer.  
Bu çalışmaya katılım gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. Eğer araştırmaya 
katılmaya devam etmek istemezseniz, istediğiniz bir yerde çalışmayı bırakma 
hakkınız vardır. 
Bu araştırma bilimsel bir amaçla yapılmaktadır ve katılımcı bilgilerinin 
gizliliği esas tutulmaktadır. Adınız ve soyadınız sorulmayacaktır ve böylece 
kimliğiniz gizli kalacaktır. Bu kabul formu, araştırmanın soru kısmından ayrı 
olarak saklanacaktır. Bu araştırmadan elde edilen bilgiler sadece grup olarak 
değerlendirilecektir. 
Bu anket, bir test değildir. Soruların doğru veya yanlış bir cevabı yoktur. 
Eğer çalışmaya katılmaya gönüllü olursanız lütfen bütün soruları olabildiğince 
samimi bir şekilde kendi yaşantınız doğrultusunda cevaplamaya çalışın. 
Çalışmayla ilgili sorularınız olursa araştırmacı Psk. Şebnem Erinç’e 536 
498 97 68 numaralı telefondan ya da sebnemerincc@gmail.com e-posta 
adresinden ya da çalışmanın danışmanı olan Prof. Dr. Diane Sunar’a 
diane.sunar@bilgi.edu.tr adresinden ulaşabilirsiniz. Araştırmaya katılarak 
yaptığınız değerli katkı ve ayırdığınız zaman için çok teşekkür ederim. 
 
Araştırmanın şartlarını okudum ve katılmayı kabul ediyorum.   ☐ 
Araştırmanın şartlarını okudum ve katılmayı kabul etmiyorum. ☐ 
 
Tarih (gün/ay/yıl):........./.........../.............. 
 
 
 
